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E V A L U A T I N G HUMANITARIAN A C T I O N 
NIELS DABELSTEIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Evaluation of humanitarian action is becoming increasingly important for sev-
eral reasons: 
• The effectiveness of relief operations is crucial to the beneficiaries. 
• Humanitarian operations are becoming more complex and more frequent. 
The number of conflicts requiring humanitarian assistance has increased dra-
matically, and humanitarian aid's share of overall international aid reached a 
peak of 10% in 1994. 
• Humanitarian operations are characterised by turbulence, uncertainty, inse-
curity, political sensitivity and multitudes of beneficiary groups, imple-
menting actors and funding agencies with different interests and agendas. At 
operational level the focus on immédiate needs and tasks detracts attention 
from broader and long-term perspectives. 
• Humanitarian agencies have short institutional memories. Personnel turn-
over is extremely rapid and the majority of field workers are young and have 
a relatively short "life time". Hard-learned lessons are not passed on. 
2. C U R R E N T ISSUES IN EVALUATING HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
Over the past few years several evaluations of humanitarian responses have 
been conducted by various implementing and funding agencies. While indeed 
valuable, they mostly focus on a limited field of operation or on the operations 
of a single agency. 
Among bilatéral donors the African Food Crisis of the mid-1980s prompted at 
least two major évaluations: by US AID in 1986 and ODA in 1988. Since then, 
there have been several more significant studies, for example those by CIDA in 
1992, SIDA in 1994 and 1995; ODA, 1990, 1994 and 1995; the Netherlands in 
1994 and US AID in 1994. Since its formation in 1992 ECHO has undertaken 
over 100 project evaluations with a more narrow operational focus. More 
recently two evaluations of humanitarian programmes in complex emergencies 
have been undertaken with the encouragement and support of bilateral donors -
one on Operation Lifeline Sudan (Apthorpe 1996) and one on WFP's operations 
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in support of refugees and displaced persons in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea 
and Côte d'Ivoire (Karim 1996). The growth in the number of humanitarian aid 
evaluations undertaken by donor organisations has been mirrored within the UN 
system and NGOs. Worth mentioning are the UNHCR/UNICEF/WFP evalua-
tion of Operational Co-ordination in the Great Lakes Region during 1996 and 
the IASC (International Accounting Standards Committee) evaluation of Strate-
gie Co-ordination in the Great Lakes Region during 1996 2. However, many of 
these studies are not placed in the public domain or, at least, are not readily 
available. 
In 1995-96 the largest and most comprehensive evaluation ever of an emer-
gency programme was undertaken by the DANIDA-led Steering Committee of 
the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda which assessed the 
international response to the conflict and genocide (Eriksson et al. 1996). 
The Rwanda evaluation was unusual in many ways, two of which stand out: 
• it was an evaluation of the entire international community's response to 
genocide organised jointly by 38 very diverse agencies, and 
• the Rwanda genocide and mass movement of refugees was a highly dynamic 
event in which the international community operated without clearly defined 
objectives and outcomes. 
The evaluation consisted of four studies: Historical Perspective (Sellstrôm and 
Wohlgemuth 1996), Early Warning and Conflict Management (Adelman and 
Suhrke 1996), Humanitarian Aid and Effects (Borton et al. 1996), and Rebuild-
ing Post-War Rwanda (Kumar and Tardif-Douglin 1996) and a synthesis 
(Eriksson et al. 1996). The division of labour between the four study teams was 
based on the continuum concept: emergency prevention; emergency prepared-
ness and delivery; repatriation, rehabilitation and reconstruction; and the rela-
tionship between emergencies, emergency aid and long-term development. The 
continuum would be covered through a multidimensional approach with the 
four component studies each covering a dimension of the very complex emerg-
ency in Rwanda seen in a regional context. 
The Rwanda evaluation was the first joint evaluation of collective operations in 
a complex emergency. While not necessarily more cost effective than a number 
of individual evaluations, its value lies in the broad coverage, the comprehen-
siveness of analyses and thus in the validity of lessons learned. The evaluation 
was an eye opener - in many respects - also for the aid evaluation profession 
(Dabelstein 1996). 
As more evaluations of humanitarian assistance operations are completed, it has 
become possible to compare the approaches as well as the results of different 
studies. Such comparisons reveal remarkable différences in the scope and meth-
ods used by the studies, and it would not be a great exaggeration to characterise 
the current situation as "methodological anarchy". Given the differences in 
approach, methods and resources, the comparison of the results is highly prob-
lematic and from a policy perspective the studies are of limited use beyond the 
organisations upon which they focused. Given the highly interconnected nature 
2. One might wonder why two such closely related evaluations were carried out simultaneously but separately instead 
of being merged into one comprehensive study. 
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of assistance, contributions, and interventions by different organisations and 
agencies within humanitarian assistance programmes, the inability to compare 
evaluations is a cause of concern (Borton and Macrae 1998). 
An almost universal finding of evaluations of humanitarian assistance has been 
that the evaluation process was considerably hampered by lack of consistent and 
comparable data on key aspects of the programmes. The Joint Evaluation of 
Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Borton et al. 1996) found that: "The avail-
ability and quality of performance data and reporting by officiai agencies and 
NGOs ... was highly variable. In some locations ... the availability of data was 
patchy and frequently not comparable between agencies due to a lack of stan-
dardised survey methods and inadequate technical co-ordination. In such areas 
the information available did not provide a sufficient basis for assessing impact 
or performance, or . . . adjusting programme activities to improve performance" 
(p. 162). 
Similarly the Programme Policy Evaluation of WFP assistance to refugees and 
displaced persons in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire over the 
period 1990-95 (Apthorpe 1996) stated: "One of the recurring themes of the 
evaluation is the lack of consistent and reliable data, a failing that has been a 
major constraint for ail aspects of the operation" (p. 9). 
Thus, better monitoring and reporting Systems are sine qua non to achieving 
long-term improvement in the evaluation of humanitarian aid, as well as to 
enhancing the quality of its management by international donors and imple-
menting agencies. 
3. INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE EVALUATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 
The necessity to identify and encourage adoption of best practice in monitoring, 
reporting, and evaluation of humanitarian response to complex emergencies is 
recognised by a range of donor organisations and relief agencies, a development 
considerably assisted by the publication in March 1996 of the Joint Evaluation 
of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda (Eriksson et al. 1996). Stimulated consid-
erably by this experience a series of meetings were held within a variety of for-
mal and informai policy fora for accountability and performance of humanitar-
ian action. These have included a meeting of the Hexagon Group in May 1996 3 
which noted the need to co-ordinate various initiatives on development and 
application of codes and standards and for donors to develop a common set of 
monitoring and reporting procédures. Following the Hexagon meeting a joint 
DANIDA/ODA meeting, known as the Stakis Meeting, in June 1996 agreed to 
explore the scope to establish an informai network on standards, performance 
assessment and reporting, and to conduct a mapping exercise documenting 
existing reporting requirements and evaluation mechanisms. 
These initiatives led the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) to develop 
ALNAP - the Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance in 
humanitarian assistance - with support of the UK Overseas Development 
3. Comprising Heads of Humanitarian/Emergency Aid Sections of Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, 





















Administration (ODA, now DFID). The principal activities of ALNAP are to 
collect, periodically synthesise and disseminate the results of évaluations of 
humanitarian aid programmes; to conduct studies of key topics, to conduct 
seminars on specifie issues of policy importance, and to establish a moderated 
e-mail discussion. 
In addition to the above initiatives, important work has also been done within 
the UN System, among NGOs and the DAC. 
Within the UN, the "Substantive Inter-Agency Working Group on Evaluation 
and Accountability", chaired by DHA (now OCHA), was formed in early 1996 
to consider ways in which the monitoring and evaluation activities of the rele-
vant UN agencies could be better co-ordinated and shared. 
The NGO community has developed accountability mechanisms and standards, 
which included the formulation of the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct 
(SCHR 1994), which is now adopted by more than 150 NGOs. Following this, 
the Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (SCHR) and the US NGO 
umbrella organisation InterAction agreed to jointly develop a Claimants' Char-
ter setting out the entitlement rights of beneficiaries and a set of "industry stan-
dards" covering minimum and relative entitlements, modes of delivery of assis-
tance, and accountability of intervening agencies. The project, called Sphere, 
will present the proposed standards in early 1999. 
Finally, the DAC's Working Party on Aid Evaluation, in April 1996, decided to 
prepare a compendium of best practices for monitoring and evaluation 
approaches and methodologies 4 , to identify key indicators and set standards for 
data collection and reporting as a way of facilitating assessment of overall effec-
tiveness and impact of programmes, and to encourage collaborative évaluations. 
All these initiatives took place and are pursued within established fora: the 
donor community, the NGO community and the UN family, and although there 
is a considerable degree of exchange of information and some co-ordination, 
there is a risk that the resulting charters, standards, procédures and best prac-
tices will be "owned" primarily by the initiating forum, and not be fully 
accepted and adopted by other fora. 
One particular initiative attempts to overcome this limitation. After publication 
in 1996 of the Rwanda Evaluation, a one year follow-up process (Joint Evalua-
tion Follow-up and Facilitation JEFF) was established to track and report on the 
evaluation's impact. This follow-up process revealed a gap in the international 
community's capacity to monitor, analyse, discuss objectively and facilitate the 
kind of responses, policies, and reforms that are necessary to more effectively 
prevent and mitigate the impact of violent conflict. This global level gap cannot 
be filled by the UN, NGOs or bilaterals alone; most of their structures and man-
dates were created in and for another time; and their current involvement in 
complex emergencies could present real or perceived conflicts of interest. 
Finally, most existing structures tend to be defined by limited purposes and par-
ticipation, e.g., humanitarian, developmental, political, or military, etc. (JEFF 
1997). 
4. This work will produce two separate papers: a "Guidance for Evaluation Managers" to be published by the DAC 
and a "Good Practice Review" published by ODI's Relief and Rehabilitation Network (Hallam 1998). 
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In early 1997, a small group of individuals from the governmental and non-gov-
ernmental sectors 5 who had been involved in the évaluation and its follow-up 
began to discuss how to create a forum and an international mechanism to 
improve the way in which the international community could deal with this gap. 
The group set up a process of consultation with a broad range of bilateral, multi-
lateral, and non-governmental organisations in developed and developing coun-
tries. These consultations led to a proposai to create a "capacity" with an "Inter-
national Council" to analyse, monitor and report on the collective ability of the 
international System to deal with potential and actual violent conflict 6. An 
important aspect of the "International Council" would be to get the diverse 
group of actors out of their development, political, or humanitarian boxes to 
jointly search for and advocate solutions. 
The "Council" should be inclusive, encompassing those institutions who play 
important roles in conflict prone and ridden areas, e.g. not only governments, 
multilateral and private voluntary organisations, but also multinational corpora-
tions and the media. It should include representatives from developing as well 
as developed countries. The "Council 's" mandate should cover political and 
development factors and assistance in pre- and post- conflict periods and 
humanitarian assistance. Such a "Council" cannot be truly independent, but it 
will derive its strength from its collaborative and multi-dependent character 
similar to that of the Steering Committee for the Joint Evaluation of Emergency 
Assistance to Rwanda. Although there is a general acceptance of the need for 
such a body, concrete steps to establish it have yet to be taken. 
4. WHY IS EVALUATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION DIFFERENT 
There are many ways in which the evaluation of humanitarian action in 
complex emergencies is little different from evaluation of development aid in 
general: Terms of Reference need to be prepared, teams selected, field study 
undertaken and reports and recommendations prepared. However, the very char-
acteristics of complex emergencies, the political and military context, and the 
way international assistance is organised and provided require the explicit con-
sideration of, and in many instances an emphasis upon, approaches to evalua-
tion which are not typical of those used in development aid. 
• How to Evaluate 
Reconstructing the History 
A resuit of the characteristics of complex emergencies is that key information 
on a range of matters of vital significance to evaluators is often unavailable. 
Whilst evaluators of development assistance are also often faced with lack of 
information on key indicators or decisions, such problems are considerably and 
routinely more serious in evaluations of humanitarian assistance in complex 
emergencies. The multiplicity of actors, the fluidity of the situation, the difficul-
ties of working in the context of war and instability, the frequent absence of 
5. DANIDA, IFRC, ODI, OXFAM, SIDA, USAID 
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baseline data on the condition of the affected/target populations prior to the 
assistance intervention, the failure by some agencies to monitor key indicators, 
the lack of agreement on standardised monitoring procédures and protocols 
among agencies, and the difficulties of adhering to normal standards for record-
ing discussions and decisions and maintaining filing Systems, ail combine to 
produce a situation where information which is vital to evaluators either does 
not exist or is not easily accessible. Thus, evaluators of responses to complex 
emergencies are routinely faced not only with the need to compensate for miss-
ing data, but also to contend with a lack of information on the context, the pre-
cise sequence of events during the period and the goals and (often changing) 
policies of different actors at different stages of the emergency. In other words 
they have to reconstruct "histories" and "pictures" of the events to serve as a 
form of baseline from which to judge the appropriateness and effectiveness of 
the policies and interventions. 
"Total System" evaluations will almost always require a substantial degree of 
"baseline" construction, to fit alongside evaluations of response policies and 
selected illustrative projects. However, evaluations of single projects - even 
comparatively "technical" projects - do not escape the need to construct such 
baselines. The evaluation of a project by Agency B to establish treatment cen-
tres for dysentery cases or a project by Agency C to establish water production 
and distribution Systems for displaced populations will require context setting, 
explanation of the events in the project area, assessment of the needs that the 
projects were attempting to address, and illustration of the relationship between 
the projects undertaken and those undertaken in the same area by other agen-
cies. Such explanation may reveal that alternative actions by the agencies or 
other actors earlier in the emergency might have prevented the dysentery out-
break or avoided the population being displaced. More effective action earlier 
by agencies B and C or by other agencies and actors might have avoided the 
need for subsequent interventions. 
Policy Evaluation 
The construction of narrative histories, as discussed above, is just one of the 
tools commonly used by those undertaking "policy evaluation". The approaches 
and techniques of policy evaluation are likely to be particularly helpful to evalu-
ators explaining and analysing policies in relation to complex emergencies -
regardless of the scope and nature of an intervention - and are considered 
briefly below 
Explanation based on the separation of cause from effect is often not possible 
when looking at a complex System composed of numerous interdependent rela-
tionships; it may not be possible to separate cause and effect because the direc-
tion of influence is often circular rather than linear. Thus methods which are 
more common in historical or philosophical research are often more productive 
than those traditionally employed in the social sciences. Such methods acknowl-
edge the complexity and interdependent nature of events in the real world and 
ask not, "did X cause Y?" but rather, "what happened?" and "why?". In other 
words, in order to understand and be able to deal with situations and structures, 
they seek to build narratives about specifie events and processes, rather than 
theorising grandly and establishing causal relationships. 
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Evaluation has much to gain by borrowing from these historical and philosophi-
cal methods. The first step in using this approach to analyse a particular set of 
events and processes is to construct a narrative history to serve as a kind of 
model or spectrum through which to view what is to be understood and 
explained. A range of different actors may be asked to tell their story, recognis-
ing that what they say represents the truth as they see it or the truth, as they 
would like the evaluator to see it. In this way a partial understanding of some-
one else's view of reality may be developed. The stories of many different 
actors are then added to the available documentary evidence to construct the 
narrative history. The narrative history is therefore more than a simple chronol-
ogy. It details not just what happened and when, but also who was involved, and 
links significant events. For an evaluator, this narrative history establishes a 
baseline, or template, which helps to make judgements about events and pro-
cesses. 
The evaluator then has to go beyond this baseline, or template, and explain why 
actors did what they did and with what effects. In other words, filter the narra-
tive (raw data) through some sort of analytical framework and draw practical 
conclusions accordingly. The framework may arise out of the stories them-
selves. When many different stories are accumulated, consistent patterns may 
emerge. Alternatively, the framework may arise out of previous studies and be 
confirmed by the évidence revealed in the narrative history. 
At the same time, it must be remembered that consultancy is not research, nor 
research consultancy: each has its own standards and practices. Currently, most 
évaluations of humanitarian aid are done through consultancies. The main 
exception to this general rule is the Rwanda Joint Evaluation. In this case, the 
level of resources and time committed was such that the research/consultancy 
line was significantly blurred. 
The narrative history approach described above is particularly suited to evaluat-
ing complex emergencies because it relies on qualitative rather than quantitative 
data; because it allows the evaluator to focus on actions and intentions; and 
because it highlights the competing agendas of the diverse range of actors. Fur-
thermore, use of the narrative history approach does not preclude the use of 
more analytical models, such as logical frameworks or cost-effectiveness 
reviews, to examine specifie components of an emergency assistance program. 
Working in Areas of Conflict and Instability 
The nature of the matter requires that evaluations of responses to complex 
emergencies be undertaken in areas that have recently experienced active con-
flict and may continue to experience instability and insecurity. Whilst it is rare 
for evaluation teams to be deployed to areas of active conflict, this is not 
unknown. Whether an evaluation takes place during active conflict or shortly 
after, the context of conflict and instability affects the work of the evaluation 
team. Probably the most important factors are the impact of the events upon 
those being interviewed and the extreme sensitivity of the issues. 
Regardless of who the team is interviewing, be it government officiais or a 
"rebel" faction, relief workers, military personnel within the factions and in 
peacekeeping contingents, or the affected civilian population who received 






















empathises with, the experiences that the interviewees have endured. The 
affected population will have just experienced a civil war during which they 
may have been forcibly displaced, had relatives and friends killed, either in the 
fighting or during atrocities committed against civilians, and seen their Per-
sonal, social and perhaps cultural identities shattered. Psycho-social trauma may 
affect much larger numbers than is evident to an outsider, particularly if unfa-
miliar with the local language and untrained in the diagnosis of post-traumatic 
stress disorders. Exposed to such extreme experiences and perhaps having 
themselves witnessed massacre sites, it is not unheard of for members of evalu-
ation teams to also experience mild forms of traumatic stress disorders. 
Civil wars greatly exacerbate and deepen fault lines within a society and may 
well create new cleavages in previously coherent groups (e.g. between those 
who stayed through the conflict and those who sought safety outside the coun-
try; those who came to support a new faction and those who remained loyal to a 
former government or faction). Such is the intensity of feeling and the polarisa-
tion of affected societies that objectivity and the truth become difficult concepts 
to uphold. It is not uncommon for evaluators working in complex emergencies 
to experience two intelligent and articulate adults giving completely contradic-
tory versions of the same event. In such situations evaluators may have to 
accept that their search for "the truth" may never be successful. The implication 
of this for their work is that the veracity of information collected cannot be 
taken for granted and will require constant checking and cross-checking. 
• What to Evaluate7 
OECD/DAC's definition of evaluation as "an examination, as systematic and 
objective as possible, of an on-going or completed project or programme, its 
design, implementation and results, with the aim of determining its efficiency, 
effectiveness, impact, sustainability and the relevance of its objectives" has 
become the standard for evaluating development programmes. While these 
evaluation criteria are broadly appropriate for humanitarian assistance pro-
grammes, their usefulness may be enhanced by expanding the meaning of these 
criteria and by adding sub-criteria, such as "coverage", "coherence" and "con-
nectedness". These complementary sub-criteria are discussed below. 
Efficiency measures the outputs - qualitative and quantitative - in relation to the 
inputs. This generally requires comparing alternative approaches to achieving 
the same outputs, to see whether the most efficient process has been used. 
Effectiveness measures the extent to which the activity achieves its purpose, or 
whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit 
within the criteria of effectiveness is timeliness (for if the delivery of food assis-
tance is significantly delayed the nutritional status of the target population will 
decline). There is value in using it more explicitly as one of the standard criteria 
because of its importance in the assessment of emergency programmes. Simi-
larly, issues of resourcing and preparedness should be addressed 
Impact looks at the wider effects of the project - social, economie, technical, 
environmental - on individuals, communities, and institutions. Impacts can be 
7. This section draws extensively on "Good Practice Review - Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance Programmes in 
Complex Emergencies" referred to in footnote 4. 
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immediate and long-range, intended and unintended, positive and negative, 
macro (sector) and micro (household). Impact studies address the question: 
what real difference has the activity made to the beneficiaries? How many have 
been affected? 
Relevance is concerned with assessing whether the project is in line with local 
needs and priorities (as well as with donor policy). A recent evaluation of 
humanitarian assistance replaced the criteria of relevance with the criteria of 
appropriateness - the need "to tailor humanitarian activities to local needs, 
increasing ownership, accountability, and cost-effectiveness accordingly" 
(Minear 1994). However, the two criteria complement rather than substitute 
each other. "Relevance" refers to the overall goal and purpose of a programme, 
whereas "appropriateness" is more focused on the activities and inputs. The 
addition of the new criteria drew attention to the fact that even where the overall 
programme goal is relevant - for example, to improve nutritional status - there 
are still questions to be asked about the programme purpose. Distributing large 
quantities of food aid may not be the best way of improving nutritional status. 
Alternatives could include food for work, cash for work, or measures to 
improve the functioning of local markets. Furthermore, even if distribution of 
food aid is deemed appropriate, it is still necessary to examine the 
appropriateness of the food that is distributed. 
Sustainability - of particular importance for development aid - is concerned 
with measuring whether an activity or an impact is likely to continue after donor 
funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as 
financially sustainable. However, many humanitarian interventions, in contrast 
to development projects, are not designed to be sustainable. They still need 
assessing, however, in regard to whether, in responding to acute and immediate 
needs, they take the longer-term into account. Larry Minear has referred to this 
as connectedness, the need "to assure that activities of a short-term emergency 
nature are carried out in a context which takes longer-term and interconnected 
problems into account" (Minear 1994). For example, otherwise efficient food 
distribution programmes can damage roads used by local traders, while the 
presence of large refugee camps can resuit in severe environmental impacts in 
neighbouring areas. Local institutions can also suffer - the high salaries paid by 
international NGOs can attract skilled staff away from government clinics and 
schools, leaving the local population with reduced levels of service. Large-scale 
relief programmes can also have a significant impact on local power structures, 
for better or for worse. 
Coverage - the need "to reach major population groups facing life-threatening 
suffering wherever they are, providing them with assistance and protection pro-
portionate to their need and devoid of extraneous political agendas" (Minear, 
1994) - alerts evaluators that complex emergencies and associated humanitarian 
programmes can have significantly differing impacts on different population 
sub-groups, whether these are defined in terms of ethnicity, gender, socio-eco-
nomic status, occupation, location (urban/rural or inside/outside of a country 
affected by conflict) or family circumstance (e.g. single mother, orphan). Pro-
grammes need to be assessed both in terms of which groups are included in a 
programme, and the differential impact on those included. For example, studies 




















went to government-controlled areas, penalising those in areas of Tigray and 
Eritrea controlled by insurgent movements (Minear 1994). Other studies have 
revealed that single mothers may be disadvantaged when it cornes to access to 
resources, as they are unable to leave children to queue for relief goods. In the 
case of the Great Lakes emergency, it was found that the coverage of the 
response varied enormously: refugees and IDPs, and residents in neighbouring 
IDP camps, were often treated in quite different ways, despite having very simi-
lar needs (Borton et al. 1996) 
Cohérence - refers to policy cohérence, and the need to assess security, devel-
opmental, trade and military policies as well as humanitarian policies, to ensure 
that there is consistency and, in particular, that ail policies take into account 
humanitarian and human rights considérations. 
A notable lack of coherence was evident in the international community's 
response to the Great Lakes emergency in 1994. During the crisis military con-
tingents were withdrawn from Rwanda during the genocide, when there is evi-
dence to suggest that a rapid deployment of troops could have prevented many 
of the killings and the subsequent refugee influx into Zaire. This was then fol-
lowed by a huge relief operation. 
In other instances, donor-imposed trade conditions have been blamed for pre-
cipitating economie crisis and conflict, undermining longer-term development 
policies. Coherence can also be analysed solely within the humanitarian sphere 
- to see whether ail the actors are working towards the same basic goals. For 
example, there have been instances of one major UN agency promoting the 
return of refugees to their host country while another is diametrically opposed 
to such policies. 
Finally, it is also important to assess whether agencies are taking into account 
the safety of their own staff, not only from violence, but also from sickness and 
disease. For example, staff should not be expected to work for long periods in 
highly volatile areas - where their personal safety may be in doubt - without 
adequate support. 
Finally, there is the important issue of co-ordination. This could be considered 
under the criteria of effectiveness, for a poorly co-ordinated response is unlikely 
to maximise effectiveness or impact. However, given the multiplicity of actors 
involved in an emergency response, it is important that co-ordination is explic-
itly considered - the intervention of a single agency cannot be evaluated in iso-
lation from what others are doing, particularly as what may seem appropriate 
from the point of view of a single actor, may not be appropriate from the point 
of view of the System as a whole. 
5. CONCLUSION 
While individual organisations' evaluations of their own activities may address 
ail or most of the above issues, they will tend to focus on a limited field of oper-
ation. Other activities may only be treated as context, not as complementary and 
inter-linked, often overlapping and sometimes conflicting. Agency specifie 
evaluations will more often than not evaluate implementation of policies rather 
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than the relevance and applicability of those policies and the assumptions 
behind them. 
The Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda showed the syner-
getic effect of many agencies co-operating, thereby amplifying the power of 
lessons. It documented that multi-agency, joint, overall evaluations will yield 
generally applicable lessons for the political, military and humanitarian Systems 
and can focus policy discussions and achieve an impetus that is simply out of 
reach of any number of smaller, partial coverage studies. Joint évaluations 
should become a regular feature of the humanitarian System if the System is to 
keep learning and improving effectively. 
The Rwanda evaluation was not initiated by the "system" but by a single 
agency. It is by no means certain that a similar initiative will succeed in the 
future. None of the existing international bodies represent the entire humanitar-
ian aid community - or the beneficiaries. There is a need to identify or establish 
an independent international unit responsible for monitoring and evaluating the 
totality of emergency response and humanitarian assistance. It might be worth 
looking at the evaluation system set up for the Global Environmental Fund or to 
revisit the proposed "International Capacity". 
Acronyms 
ALNAP Active Learning Network 
on Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Assistance 
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency 
DAC Development Assistance Committee (of the OECD) 
DANIDA Danish International Development Assistance 
DFID Department for International Development (UK) 
DHA UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs 
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Office 
IASC International Accounting Standards Committee 
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent 
IDP Internally Displaced Person 
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
JEFF Joint Evaluation Follow-up Monitoring and Facilitation Network 
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation 
(US: Private Voluntary Organisation) 
OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
ODA Overseas Development Administration (now DFID) 
ODI Overseas Development Institute 
OECD Organisation for Economie Cooperation and Development 
SCHR Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response (NGOs) 
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency 
UN United Nations 
UNHCR UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
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